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Abstract
Four different schemes for classifying exchange rate regimes are compared for developing
countries. Disagreements are substantial, and alternative schemes disagree as much with each
other as with the official scheme. Only the official scheme shows a trend towards floating
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years there has been a proliferation of alternative schemes for classifying 
exchange rate regimes, but little systematic comparison between them.  We compare the 
official (IMF-reported) classification of exchange rate regimes with three alternative 
schemes for a large sample of developing countries (excluding transition economies) over 
the period 1985-2000.  It is shown that different alternative schemes produce markedly 
different classifications, both from each other and from the official scheme, and display 
much less of a trend towards greater flexibility than is evident in the official scheme.  
Agreement between classification schemes has not increased over time, as one might 
have expected given the intellectual shift in favour of policy transparency over the period. 
 
 
2. CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES 
 
In recent years various alternative schemes for classifying exchange rate regimes have 
been proposed, based not on what countries claim, but on the realised behaviour of the 
nominal exchange rate and (sometimes) other indicators of exchange rate intervention.  
Since an important motivation for this research effort has been the perception that 
countries have not infrequently been following a different regime from that claimed, one 
would expect alternative schemes to agree more with each other than with the official 
scheme.  Unless they do, their claim to be a more accurate measure of the “true” regime 
than the official classification is somewhat hollow.  Here we examine this issue for a data 
set that covers 74 developing countries (excluding transition economies) over the period 
1985-2000. 
 
In order to keep things simple we use a highly aggregated system of regime 
classification, and we exclude all high-inflation observations with consumer price 
inflation over 40 per cent per annum, for which a regime classification is somewhat 
artificial because of the inevitability of sharp nominal depreciations.  Regimes are 
aggregated into three categories as follows: 
1) Hard Pegs (No Separate Legal Tender, Currency Board); 
2) Soft Pegs (Peg to a Single Currency, Peg to a Composite of Currencies, Crawling Pegs 
and Bands, Limited Flexibility); 
3) Floats (Managed Floating, Independently Floating). 
 
Hard pegs include countries with a common currency (e.g. the CFA zone) as well as 
those that have adopted the currency of a larger country (e.g. Panama).  Because the 
definition of hard pegs is relatively uncontroversial (and not all classification schemes 
separate them out from soft pegs), we use the identical definition of hard pegs for all 
schemes.  This leaves us with a binary choice: a soft peg or a float. 
 
For the official classification, we take the IMF classification given on the “Exchange 
Rate Arrangements” page of International Financial Statistics on 31 December.  We then 
consider three alternative schemes: those of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) [YS], 
Shambaugh (2004) [JS] and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) [RR].  The YS scheme is 
designed as a wide measure of policy intervention, and uses cluster analysis based on the 
volatility of exchange rates, interest rates and international reserves through the calendar 
year.  The JS scheme is essentially designed to separate pegs from non-pegs based on 
nominal exchange rate movements.  It allows for at most one significant devaluation 
during a year.  The RR scheme uses exchange rates in the parallel market, where this 
exists, rather than the official market, and employs a relatively wide definition of a peg or 
band that discounts large movements in up to 20 per cent of the observations within a 
identified episode (see the references for more details). 
 
 
3. ANALYSIS 
 
Table I shows that, just in terms of distribution, these schemes produce markedly 
different results. 
 
 
Table I.  Basic statistics on classification schemes
 
Classification Proportion of floats (%) Persistence 
IMF 41.1 0.87 
JS 71.0 0.83 
YS 45.7 0.46 
RR 28.2 0.90 
Notes:  The data refer to a common sample of 617 observations excluding those that are 
hard pegs and with inflation > 40 %.  Persistence is the correlation coefficient between 
classifications in successive years (float = 1; soft peg = 0). 
 
 
The proportion of floats varies from a low of 28.2 per cent for RR to a high of 71.0 per 
cent for JS.  This variation largely reflects judgements about how stringently to define a 
peg or band (i.e. how wide a range of fluctuation to accept).  Note that regimes change 
relatively rarely in all classifications except YS, where persistence is markedly lower, 
presumably because the measured volatility of reserves and interest rates varies much 
more from year to year than does the volatility of exchange rates on which other schemes 
focus. 
 
How much agreement is there across classification schemes?  Table II presents the raw 
correlations, together with an adjusted measure that corrects for a downward bias caused 
by the difference in the mean proportion of floats.  The adjustment allows for the fact 
that, if two classifications identify different proportions of floats, there must be 
disagreements at least equal to the difference between means (the maximum raw 
correlation is one minus the difference in means, so the adjustment divides by this to 
restore a maximum of one). 
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Table II.  Correlations between classification schemes 
 
 IMF JS YS RR 
 Raw correlations 
IMF 1    
JS 0.365 1   
YS 0.281 0.379 1  
RR 0.154 0.083 0.054 1 
Mean 0.267 0.275 0.238 0.097 
 Adjusted correlations 
IMF 1    
JS 0.520 1   
YS 0.295 0.507 1  
RR 0.176 0.145 0.065 1 
Mean 0.330 0.391 0.289 0.129 
Notes:  The data refer to a common sample of 617 observations excluding those that are 
hard pegs and with inflation > 40 %.  Adjusted correlations are raw correlations divided 
by one minus the difference in means shown in Table 1. 
 
 
It is noticeable that even the adjusted correlations (which are necessarily larger than the 
raw ones) are quite low, with only two out of six exceeding 0.3.  The RR classification, 
which is based on parallel rates (where they exist) has a particularly low correlation with 
the other classifications.  Only in the case of YS is there significantly greater agreement 
with another alternative classification (JS) than with the official classification.  This 
means that it is likely to matter, in any empirical work, not only whether the IMF or an 
alternative classification is used, but which alternative classification (for some evidence 
on this, see Bleaney and Francisco, 2006). 
 
These relatively low correlations mean that there is even less agreement between 
classification schemes in the identification of dates when there was a switch of regime.  
Table III shows the correlations between switch dummies (=1 for a year when a switch is 
identified; = 0 when it is not) for the four classifications.  The correlations all lie in the 
range 0.07 to 0.16 (and this includes some cases where different classifications identify 
switches in opposite directions in the same year!). 
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Table III.  Correlations between regime switches 
 
 IMF JS YS RR 
  
IMF 1    
JS 0.122 1   
YS 0.072 0.156 1  
RR 0.111 0.111 0.092 1 
Mean 0.102 0.130 0.107 0.105 
Notes:  The data refer to a common sample of 545 observations excluding those that are 
hard pegs and with inflation > 40 %, with a switch of regime between a soft peg and a 
float defined as one and no switch as zero. 
 
 
According to the official classification scheme, there was a marked increase in floating 
amongst developing countries over the period 1985-2000.  It has been suggested that 
developing countries tend to manage floats heavily, particularly in order to mitigate the 
balance sheet effects of real exchange rate movements when many liabilities are 
denominated in foreign currency (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Hausmann et al., 2001).  If 
that is the case, then any time trend in favour of floating should be much weaker 
according to the unofficial classifications.  The results shown in Table IV support this 
hypothesis.  All classifications display a markedly greater likelihood of floating at higher 
inflation rates, but after controlling for this effect the alternative schemes have a much 
smaller rate of increase in floating over time (although still significant in two out of three 
cases). 
 
 
Table IV.  Floating as a function of inflation and time
 
 Classification scheme 
Regressor IMF JS YS RR 
Constant 0.22 
(8.51) 
0.53 
(20.5) 
0.252 
(8.06) 
0.040 
(1.35) 
Inflation rate 0.017 
(8.24) 
0.014 
(6.70) 
0.013 
(5.61) 
0.025 
(11.1) 
Time 0.0328 
(11.1) 
0.0078 
(2.69) 
0.0135 
(5.61) 
-0.0032 
(-1.02) 
R-squared 0.138 0.044 0.043 0.146 
Sample size 1051 1051 771 783 
Notes.  Dependent variable =1 for float and 0 for soft peg.  Sample is soft pegs and floats 
excluding observations with inflation > 40 %.  Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Time=0 in 1990. 
 
 
Finally, we ask whether there has been any trend towards greater agreement between 
classification schemes over time, after controlling for inflation effects.  We do this by 
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setting up a dependent variable that is equal to one if there is agreement between a pair of 
classification schemes that a country was floating/pegging in a particular year, and zero if 
there is a disagreement.  Then, for each pair, we estimate the probability of agreement as 
a function of the inflation rate and a time trend.  Table V shows the results for each pair. 
 
It is clear from Table V that there tends to be more agreement at lower inflation rates – 
the inflation coefficient is significantly negative in three out of six cases (all involving the 
YS scheme as one of the pair), and insignificant in the other three.  On the other hand 
there is no consistent picture for the time trend – the coefficient is significantly positive 
for the IMF/JS pair, significantly negative for the IMF/YS pair, and insignificant for the 
rest. 
 
 
Table V.  Probit analysis of agreement between classification schemes
 
 Regressor 
Pair of 
classifications 
constant Inflation rate Time Sample size 
IMF 
JS 
0.19 
(2.63) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.0303 
(3.73) 
1051 
IMF 
YS 
0.65 
(87.48) 
-0.019 
(-2.85) 
-0.0192 
(-1.98) 
771 
 
IMF 
RR 
0.06 
(0.69) 
-0.003 
(-0.49) 
0.0133 
(1.43) 
783 
JS 
YS 
0.71 
(8.17) 
-0.028 
(-4.27) 
-0.0037 
(-0.39) 
771 
JS 
RR 
-0.23 
(-2.60) 
0.011 
(1.61) 
0.0093 
(0.99) 
783 
YS 
RR 
0.37 
(3.64) 
-0.027 
(-3.64) 
0.0100 
(0.95) 
614 
Notes.  Dependent variable =1 for agreement on a float/soft peg classification and 0 for 
disagreement.  Sample excludes hard pegs and observations with inflation > 40 %.  
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Time=0 in 1990. 
 
 
These results highlight the problems of developing a satisfactory scheme for classifying 
exchange rate regimes.  It could be argued that these schemes focus too much on the 
nominal exchange rate and not enough on the real exchange rate.  A crawling peg may 
stabilise the real exchange rate extremely effectively, and yet it tends to be classified as a 
significantly more flexible regime than a horizontal peg, even though the latter may be 
subject to substantial real exchange rate appreciation because of inflation differentials.  
This type of consideration seems to underlie Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) controversial 
decision to use parallel rates.  An alternative approach would be to consider real 
exchange rate volatility more explicitly. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
We have compared the outcomes of different classification schemes for exchange rate 
regimes for a sample of 74 developing countries (excluding transition economies) over 
the period 1985-2000.  The level of agreement is disappointing, with no improvement 
over time.  There is particularly little agreement on the dating of switches of regime.  
There is no greater degree of concordance amongst unofficial schemes than between 
unofficial schemes and the official scheme, despite the widespread perception that 
countries are often deviating from their declared regime.  This rather undermines the 
claim of de facto measures to identify exchange rate regimes more accurately than the 
official measure.  It also implies that, in any empirical work, results may vary 
significantly depending on the classification scheme used.  The trend towards a greater 
popularity of floating evident in the official classifications is smaller or non-existent in 
the unofficial alternatives, which lends some support to the hypothesis that developing 
countries are anxious to intervene in order to control real exchange rate volatility under 
floating, perhaps because of the fear of its impact on balance sheets when liabilities are 
denominated in foreign currency. 
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